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Abstract
A new definition of continuous-time equilibrium controls is introduced. As opposed to the
standard definition, which involves a derivative-type operation, the new definition parallels how
a discrete-time equilibrium is defined, and allows for unambiguous economic interpretation. The
terms “strong equilibria” and “weak equilibria” are coined for controls under the new and the
standard definitions, respectively. When the state process is a time-homogeneous continuous-
time Markov chain, a careful asymptotic analysis gives complete characterizations of weak and
strong equilibria. Thanks to Kakutani-Fan’s fixed-point theorem, general existence of weak and
strong equilibria is also established, under additional compactness assumption. Our theoretic
results are applied to a two-state model under non-exponential discounting. In particular, we
demonstrate explicitly that there can be incentive to deviate from a weak equilibrium, which
justifies the need for strong equilibria. Our analysis also provides new results for the existence
and characterization of discrete-time equilibria under infinite horizon.
MSC (2010): 60J27, 91A13, 93E20.
Keywords: time-inconsistency, stochastic control, strong equilibria, weak equilibria, non-
exponential discounting.
1 Introduction
Under time-inconsistency, an optimal rule derived today may not be optimal from the eyes of
a future self. There is no “dynamically optimal strategy” that is good for the whole planning
horizon, as opposed to standard time-consistent models. A sensible reaction to time-inconsistency,
introduced in Strotz [16], is to take future selves’ behavior as a constraint, and find the best current
action in response to that. When every future self also reasons in this way, the resulting strategy
is a (subgame perfect) equilibrium, from which no future self has incentive to deviate.
This equilibrium approach, while widely-accepted, is highly nontrivial for stochastic control in
continuous time. The upfront challenge is how to precisely define a continuous-time equilibrium.
In discrete time, this is not a challenge at all: Let F (x, α) be an objective function, depending
on current state x and the selected control α. An equilibrium α∗ can be defined as
F (x, α∗) ≥ F (x, α⊗1 α∗), ∀x and α, (1.1)
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where α ⊗1 α∗ means that we apply α only at time 0, and switch to α∗ from time 1 on. The
economic interpretation is clear: given that all future selves will follow α∗, using any other control
α at current time is no better than sticking to α∗, i.e. no incentive for the current self to deviate
from α∗, conforming to the equilibrium idea. A continuous-time analogy to (1.1) is far from obvious.
Since the current self only exists at “time point 0”, which carries no mass in continuous time, his
decision to use a different strategy α normally has no effect on F . In other words, while one could
replace the right hand side of (1.1) by limε↓0 F (x, α⊗ε α∗), in most cases this limit equals F (x, α∗),
leaving the comparison like (1.1) meaningless.
Ekeland and Lazrak [5] provided, for the first time, a precise definition of a continuous-time
equilibrium: roughly speaking, α∗ is an equilibrium if
lim inf
ε↓0
F (x, α∗)− F (x, α⊗ε α∗)
ε
≥ 0, ∀x and α. (1.2)
This formulation has spurred vibrant research on time-inconsistent control problems in continuous
time, arising mainly in mathematical finance; see [7], [6], [12], [17], [2], and [1], among many others.
While (1.2) has to some extent become the standard formulation of continuous-time equilibria, it
may not be fully justified in the economic sense.
As pointed out in Bjo¨rk, Khapko, and Murgoci [1, Remark 3.5], (1.2) does not correspond
perfectly to the equilibrium concept: when (1.2) holds with equality, α∗ can be a stationary point
that is not a maximum point. That is, it is possible that for some x and α, F (x, α∗) < F (x, α⊗εα∗)
for all ε > 0, but the limit in (1.2) is still zero. Then, when the current self is at the state x, there
is incentive to deviate: following α, in a however small interval [0, ε], is better than sticking to α∗.
In view of this, α∗ should not be considered as an equilibrium, yet it is included under (1.2). In
short, (1.2) may be too weak a definition to precisely reflect the equilibrium idea.
In this paper, a new definition of continuous-time equilibria is introduced: α∗ is an equilibrium
if for any x and α, there exists ε∗ = ε∗(x, α) > 0 such that
F (x, α∗) ≥ F (x, α⊗ε α∗) for all 0 < ε < ε∗. (1.3)
This is analogous to (1.1), and admits the following economic interpretation: if (1.3) is violated
for some (x, α), then for the current self at the state x, deviating to α, in a however small interval
[0, ε], is better than sticking to α∗. Such incentive to deviate disappears when α∗ is an equilibrium;
see Remark 2.2 for details. Note that (1.3) entails (1.2), but not vice versa. Throughout this paper,
we will call equilibria under (1.3) “strong equilibria” (Definition 2.2), and those under (1.2) “weak
equilibria” (Definition 2.1). The main goal of this paper is to elucidate the difference, as well as
the connection, between strong and weak equilibria.1
Specifically, we take the controlled state process X to be a time-homogeneous continuous-time
Markov chain. By selecting an appropriate generator Q for X, an agent intends to maximize his
expected cumulative running payoff over infinite horizon. The running payoff function is allowed to
be time-dependent, making the problem time-inconsistent in general. This framework particularly
covers optimization under non-exponential discounting.
By detailed asymptotic analysis of the right hand side of (1.3), now taking the form F (x,Q⊗ε
Q∗), we establish complete characterizations of both weak and strong equilibria; see Theorems 3.1
and 3.2. In short, an equilibrium being weak amounts to dominance in the first-order term, while
being strong demands a more delicate structure involving higher-order terms. This in turn leads
to a handy machinery for finding weak and strong equilibria; see Propositions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and
1A notion similar to our “strong equilibria” appeared in He and Jiang [10] for a mean-risk portfolio selection
problem. Yet, a detailed comparison between weak and strong equilibria was not their focus.
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Theorem 3.2. In a two-state model under pseudo-exponential discounting, such a machinery is
demonstrated in detail through concrete examples. In particular, we construct explicitly a weak
equilibrium Q∗ such that for some specific (x,Q), F (x,Q∗) < F (x,Q ⊗ε Q∗) for all ε > 0 small
enough. That is, although Q∗ satisfies (1.2), there is incentive to deviate from Q∗ in a however
small interval [0, ε], when the current state is x; see Example 4.3 and Remark 4.1. This justifies
the need for the new notion of strong equilibria.
Note that the machinery for finding equilibria, while useful, is meant to be applied on a case-
by-case basis, and does not say a priori whether an equilibrium exists. Thanks to Kakutani-Fan’s
fixed-point theorem, a general existence result for weak and strong equilibria can be established,
under additional compactness assumption on the admissible set of Q; see Theorem 3.3.
The literature of time-inconsistent stochastic control in continuous-time, as mentioned above,
focuses solely on weak equilbria, which are usually characterized as (i) solutions to a system of
nonlinear differential equations, the so-called extended HJB system (see e.g. [7] and [1]), or (ii) the
limit points of a sequence of discrete-time equilibria, when the discrete time mesh tends to zero
(see e.g. [17] and [1]). Our analysis complements both (i) and (ii) above.
First, note that (i) above is a partial characterization: if one finds smooth solutions to the non-
linear system, an equilibrium can be constructed from them. Yet, solving the system is generally
difficult, and it is also not clear whether every equilibrium is related to such a system. By contrast,
in our case where X is a continuous-time controlled Markov chain, more tractable than a controlled
diffusion mostly used in the literature, we obtain complete (i.e. “if and only if”) characterization for
weak equilibrium (Theorem 3.1), and an easy-to-check criterion for finding them (Proposition 3.1).
On the other hand, we obtain in Theorem 5.2 that discrete-time equilibria converge to weak equi-
libria in continuous time, under appropriate continuity assumption. Interestingly, it is guaranteed
to converge only to weak, but not strong, equilibria. As shown in Example 5.1, a sequence of
discrete-time equilibria converge uniquely to a weak equilibrium that is not strong.
Finally, our continuous-time analysis also sheds new light on discrete-time problems. In discrete
time, an equilibrium is defined unambiguously as (1.1), and it can be found by straightforward
backward sequential optimization in Pollak [15], when time horizon is finite. Under infinite horizon,
such backward procedure breaks down; it is unclear whether an equilibrium exists in general, and
a systematic way for finding equilibria is lacking. The continuous-time arguments in Theorem 3.1
and Proposition 3.1 turn out to be helpful: they can be modified to discrete time, giving a very
general existence result for equilibria, as well as a handy criterion for finding equilibria, for the kind
of time-inconsistent problems we focus on; see Theorem 5.1 and Proposition 5.1.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the setup of our time-inconsistent
problem, and defines the two distinct notions of weak and strong equilibria. Section 3 collects
the main results, including complete characterization and general existence for both weak and
strong equilibria. Section 4 applies the theoretic results to a concrete two-state model, where we
demonstrate explicitly that there can be incentive to deviate from a weak equilibrium. Section 5
derives several new results for the corresponding discrete-time problem, and proves the convergence
of discrete-time equilibria to a weak equilibrium. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Setup and Definitions
Let X = (Xt)t≥0 be a time-homogeneous continuous-time Markov chain taking values in S :=
{1, 2, . . . , N}, for some N ∈ N. The generator Q ∈ RN×N of X is to be controlled. For each i ∈ S,
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we denote by Qi the i
th row of the generator Q, and let
Di ⊆ Ei :=
{
q = (q1, . . . , qN ) ∈ RN : qj ≥ 0, j 6= i, qi = −
∑
j 6=i
qj
}
(2.1)
be the admissible set of Qi. The control space is then
Q := {Q ∈ RN×N : Qi ∈ Di, ∀i ∈ S}.
Consider a payoff function f such that for any t ≥ 0, i ∈ S, and q ∈ Di, the value f(t, i,q) ∈ R
stands for the payment rate at time t, given that Xt = i and Qi = q. We assume that
f(·, i,q) is continuous on [0,∞), for each i ∈ S and q ∈ Di. (2.2)
In addition, we impose the integrability condition
∫ ∞
0
(
sup
i∈S, q∈Di, ‖q‖≤c
|f(t, i,q)|
)
dt <∞ ∀c > 0, (2.3)
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm in RN . Note that (2.2) particularly implies that t 7→
supi∈S,q∈Di |f(t, i,q)| is lower semicontinuous, and thus Lebesgue measurable, which makes sense
of the integration in (2.3). For any i ∈ S and Q ∈ Q, (2.3) guarantees that the expected payoff
F (i,Q) := Ei,Q
[∫ ∞
0
f(t,Xt, QXt)dt
]
<∞ (2.4)
is well-defined, where Ei,Q denotes the expectation conditioned on X0 = i and the generator of X
being Q. Throughout this paper, we will write Ei for Ei,Q whenever there is no confusion about Q.
In general, an agent who aims to maximize F (i,Q) by selecting Q ∈ Q may run into the issue
of time-inconsistency. Specifically, an optimal control Q∗ ∈ Q for the problem
sup
Q∈Q
Ei
[∫ ∞
0
f(t,Xt, QXt)dt
]
(2.5)
may depend on the initial state i, and we write it as Q∗(i). At a later date t > 0 with Xt = j 6= i,
Q∗(i) may no longer be optimal for the problem (2.5), now with i replaced by j, so that the agent
is tempted to deviate to Q∗(j), optimal in his view at time t.
A typical example is optimization under non-exponential discounting. In this case, f takes the
form
f(t, i,q) = δ(t)g(i,q), (2.6)
where δ : [0,∞) → [0, 1] is a discount function, assumed to be strictly decreasing with δ(0) = 1,
and g is a general measurable function. It is well-known that the problem (2.5) is time-consistent
for the specific case δ(t) := e−ρt for some ρ > 0, but time-inconsistent in general.
Remark 2.1. The t variable in f(t, i,q) does not represent “real calendar time”, but “time dif-
ference”, i.e. the difference between the current time and the time of a future payoff. This is
well-demonstrated in the discounting setup (2.6). If t in f(t, i,q) were real calendar time, (2.4)
would be time-inhomogeneous (i.e. F (i,Q) should be F (t, i,Q)). This would make the problem
(2.5) time-consistent, and thus not of interest for our studies.
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As described in Strotz [16], when an agent is sophisticated enough to realize that his “future
selves” will override his current plan (due to the lack of commitment), a sensible reaction is to take
his future selves’ behavior as a constraint, and choose the best present action in response to that.
Assuming that all future selves reason in the same way, the agent searches for a (subgame perfect)
equilibrium strategy, from which no future self has incentive to deviate.
While such equilibrium strategies have a straightforward definition in discrete time (see e.g. Def-
inition 5.1 below), finding a precise continuous-time formulation had been a long-standing challenge.
Ekeland and Lazrak [5] provided, for the first time, a rigorous definition of a continuous-time equi-
librium, using a derivative-type operation. This has spurred vibrant research on time-inconsistent
stochastic control in continuous time, as mentioned in the introduction.
To formulate an equilibrium in the sense of [5], we introduce, for any Q,Q′ ∈ Q and ε > 0, the
concatenation of Q and Q′ at time ε, denoted by Q⊗εQ′. Using this concatenated generator means
that the evolution of X is governed first by Q on the interval [0, ε], and then by Q′ on (ε,∞).
Definition 2.1. Q∗ ∈ Q is called a weak equilibrium, if
lim inf
ε↓0
F (i,Q∗)− F (i,Q⊗ε Q∗)
ε
≥ 0, ∀Q ∈ Q and i ∈ S. (2.7)
Definition 2.1 involves a first-order inequality. This was introduced in [5] as the definition of a
continuous-time equilibrium, and followed by all subsequent research. Despite its popularity, this
formulation may not be fully justified economically.
Intuitively, what we desire from (2.7) is F (i,Q∗) ≥ F (i,Q⊗εQ∗) as ε > 0 small enough, for all
(i,Q). Yet, this is not ensured by (2.7). As pointed out in Bjo¨rk, Khapko, and Murgoci [1, Remark
3.5], the standard formulation, such as (2.7), does not correspond perfectly to the equilibrium
concept: when (2.7) holds with equality, it is unclear whetherQ∗ is a maximum point or a stationary
point. In other words, it is possible that for some Q ∈ Q and i ∈ S, F (i,Q∗) < F (i,Q ⊗ε Q∗) for
all ε > 0, but the limit in (2.7) is still zero. Then, the agent at the state i does have incentive to
deviate: following Q, in a however small interval [0, ε], is better than sticking to Q∗. As such, Q∗
should not be considered as an equilibrium, yet it is included under (2.7).
This explains the terminology “weak equilibrium” in Definition 2.1. As opposed to that, we
introduce the new notion of a strong equilibrium.
Definition 2.2. Q∗ ∈ Q is called a strong equilibrium if, for any i ∈ S and Q ∈ Q there exists
ε > 0 such that
F (i,Q∗) ≥ F (i,Q⊗ε′ Q∗) ∀0 < ε′ ≤ ε. (2.8)
Remark 2.2. Definition 2.2 admits the following economic interpretation. If (2.8) is violated for
some (i,Q), then there exist {εn}n∈N such that εn ↓ 0 and F (i,Q∗) < F (i,Q⊗εn Q∗) for all n ∈ N.
Thus, for the agent at the state i, deviating to Q, in a however small interval [0, εn], n ∈ N, is
better than sticking to Q∗. Such incentive to deviate disappears when Q∗ is a strong equilibrium.
It is of interest to investigate the relation between the standard notion of weak equilibria and
our new concept of strong equilibria. Some immediate observations can be made.
Remark 2.3. By definition, a strong equilibrium is also a weak one. On the other hand, if a weak
equilibrium satisfies (2.7) with strict inequality for all Q ∈ Q and i ∈ S, then (2.8) must hold for
any i ∈ Sand Q ∈ Q, showing that the weak equilibrium is in fact strong. The unclear, challenging
case is when Q∗ a weak equilibrium and (2.7) holds with equality for some Q ∈ Q and i ∈ S.
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The goal of this paper is to elucidate the difference, as well as the connection, between strong and
weak equilibria. This will be done at two different levels. Theoretically, complete characterizations
for both weak and strong equilibria will be derived. Based on this, we will demonstrate how a weak
equilibrium can differ from a strong one in concrete examples. In particular, we will show explicitly
that there can be incentive to deviate from a weak equilibrium, as described in Remark 2.2, which
justifies the new notion of strong equilibria.
3 The Main Results
3.1 Characterizations of Weak and Strong Equilibria
In this section, we will carry out detailed asymptotic analysis of F (i,Q∗)− F (i,Q⊗ε Q∗) as ε ↓ 0.
This will lead us to the distinct, yet connected, characterizations of weak and strong equilibria in
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2.
Recall F (i,Q) in (2.4). For any i ∈ S, Q ∈ Q, and ε > 0, we define
Fε(i,Q) := Ei
[∫ ∞
0
f(t+ ε,Xt, QXt)dt
]
. (3.1)
Then, we will write
F (Q) := (F (1, Q), . . . , F (N,Q)) and Fε(Q) := (Fε(1, Q), . . . , Fε(N,Q)).
Also recall that Qi denotes the i
th row of Q.
Lemma 3.1. Assume (2.2) and (2.3). Fix i ∈ S and Q,Q∗ ∈ Q. Then, as ε ↓ 0,
F (i,Q⊗ε Q∗) = Fε(i,Q∗) + [f(0, i, Qi) + Fε(Q∗) ·Qi] ε+ o(ε). (3.2)
Suppose further that (2.2) is strengthened to the following:
|f(t+ ε, i,q) − f(t, i,q)| ≤ h(t, ε; i,q) ∀t ≥ 0, ε > 0, i ∈ S, and q ∈ Di, (3.3)
where h is a nonnegative function such that
h(t, ε; i,q) is increasing in ε, with lim
ε↓0
h(t, ε; i,q) = 0; (3.4)∫ ∞
0
h(t, ε; i,q)dt <∞, for ε > 0 small enough. (3.5)
Then, as ε ↓ 0,
F (i,Q∗)− F (i,Q⊗ε Q∗) =
(
ΓQ
∗
(Q∗i )− ΓQ
∗
(Qi)
)
ε+ o(ε), (3.6)
where
ΓQ
∗
(Qi) := f(0, i, Qi) +Qi · F (Q∗). (3.7)
The proof of Lemma 3.1 is relegated to Appendix A.1.
Remark 3.1. Under non-exponential discounting as in (2.6), assumptions in Lemma 3.1 turn into
mild conditions on the discount function δ: (2.2) amounts to the continuity of δ; (2.3) reduces to∫ ∞
0
δ(t)dt <∞; (3.8)
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(3.3) is equivalent to the continuity of δ and∫ ∞
0
(δ(t)− δ(t + ε)) dt <∞, for ε > 0 small enough. (3.9)
Note that (3.8) implies (3.9), but not vice versa. Indeed, if (3.8) holds, the integral in (3.9) reduces
to
∫ ε
0 δ(t)dt, which is finite for all ε > 0. On the other hand, it can be checked that the hyperbolic
discount function δ(t) := 11+βt , with β > 0, satisfies (3.9), but not (3.8).
Hence, “ (2.3) and (3.3)” reduces to “δ is continuous and satisfies (3.8)”. This already covers
many commonly-seen non-exponential discount functions, such as generalized hyperbolic δ(t) :=
1
(1+βt)k
with β > 0 and k > 1, and pseudo-exponential δ(t) := λe−ρ1t + (1− λ)e−ρ2t with λ ∈ (0, 1)
and ρ1, ρ2 > 0.
Suppose X0 = i and that all future selves beyond time ε > 0 will follow Q
∗ ∈ Q. In view of
(3.6), the current self would like to follow Q∗ ∈ Q on [0, ε], rather than deviate to any other Q ∈ Q,
only if the first-order term is always nonnegative, i.e. for any Q ∈ Q,
ΓQ
∗
(Q∗i ) ≥ ΓQ
∗
(Qi). (3.10)
This relation completely characterizes weak equilibria.
Theorem 3.1. Assume (2.3) and (3.3). Then, Q∗ ∈ Q is a weak equilibrium if and only if
ΓQ
∗
(Q∗i ) ≥ ΓQ
∗
(Qi) for all (i,Q) ∈ S ×Q.
Proof. For any i ∈ S and Q ∈ Q, by Lemma 3.1 (specifically (3.6)), as ε ↓ 0,
F (i,Q∗)− F (i,Q⊗ε Q∗)
ε
=
(
ΓQ
∗
(Q∗i )− ΓQ
∗
(Qi)
)
+ o(1). (3.11)
This shows that (2.7) is satisfied (i.e. Q∗ is a weak equilibrium) if and only if (3.10) holds for all
(i,Q) ∈ S ×Q.
Theorem 3.1 gives rise to a handy criterion for weak equilibria. Specifically, for any i ∈ S and
differentiable function v : Di → R, let ∇v(α) be the gradient of v evaluated at α ∈ Di, and ∂nv(α)
be the n-th component of ∇v(α). Let
T :=
{
λ = (λ1, . . . , λN ) ∈ RN :
∑
i=1,...,N
λi = 0
}
. (3.12)
Proposition 3.1. Let f(0, i, ·) be C1 for all i ∈ S. If Q∗ ∈ Q is a weak equilibrium, then for any
i ∈ S,
(∇f(0, i, Q∗i ) + F (Q∗)) · λ ≤ 0, ∀λ ∈ T s.t. Q∗i + ελ ∈ Di for ε > 0 small enough. (3.13)
In particular, if Q∗i is a relative interior point of Di, then (3.13) reduces to
∂nf(0, i, Q
∗
i ) + F (n,Q
∗) = ∂mf(0, i, Q
∗
i ) + F (m,Q
∗), n,m = 1, . . . , N.
Furthermore, if f(0, i, ·) is additionally concave for all i ∈ S, the converse of (3.13) is also true;
that is, Q∗ is a weak equilibrium if and only if (3.13) holds for all i ∈ S.
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Proof. Let Q∗ be a weak equilibrium. Fix i ∈ S. For any ε > 0 and λ ∈ T such that Q∗i+ελ ∈ Di, by
Theorem 3.1 and recalling (3.7), we get f(0, i, Q∗i )+Q
∗
i ·F (Q∗) ≥ f(0, i, Q∗i +ελ)+(Q∗i +ελ)·F (Q∗).
It follows that
f(0, i, Q∗i + ελ)− f(0, i, Q∗i )
ε
+ F (Q∗) · λ ≤ 0.
Then (3.13) follows as ε ↓ 0. Conversely, suppose Q∗ ∈ Q satisfies (3.13) for all i ∈ S. If f(0, i, ·) is
concave for all i ∈ S, then the map ξ 7→ f(0, i, ξ)+F (Q∗) · ξ is concave for all i ∈ S. This, together
with (3.13), shows that ξ = Q∗i is a global maximum of ξ 7→ f(0, i, ξ)+F (Q∗) · ξ for all i ∈ S. That
is, ΓQ
∗
(Q∗i ) ≥ ΓQ
∗
(Qi) for all (i,Q) ∈ S ×Q. By Theorem 3.1, Q∗ is a weak equilibrium.
The usefulness of Proposition 3.1 will be apparent in Section 4, where we look for equilibria in
concrete examples.
To characterize strong equilibria, we need to upgrade (3.6) to an expansion of second order or
higher. To this end, whenever f(·, i,q) ∈ C1, we define, for any (i,Q) ∈ S ×Q, the function
G(i,Q) := Ei
[∫ ∞
0
ft(t,Xt, QXt)dt
]
.
In addition, we will write
G(Q) := (G(1, Q), G(2, Q), ..., G(N,Q)) , ΓQ
∗
(Q) :=
(
ΓQ
∗
(Qi),Γ
Q∗(Q2), ...,Γ
Q∗(QN )
)
.
Lemma 3.2. Let f satisfy (2.3) and f(·, i,q) be C1 on [0,∞) for all i ∈ S and q ∈ Di. Assume
additionally that ft also satisfies (2.3), and that
|f(t+ ε, i,q) − (f(t, i,q) + εft(t, i,q))| ≤ r(t, ε; i,q) t ≥ 0, ε > 0, i ∈ S, and q ∈ Di, (3.14)
where r is a function continuous in ε, and satisfies (3.5) with
r(t, ε; i,q)
ε
increasing in ε, ∀(t, i,q). (3.15)
Then, for any i ∈ S and Q, Q∗ ∈ Q, as ε ↓ 0,
F (i,Q∗)− F (i,Q ⊗ε Q∗) =
(
ΓQ
∗
(Q∗i )− ΓQ
∗
(Qi)
)
ε
+
1
2
(
ΛQ
∗
(i,Q∗)− ΛQ∗(i,Q)
)
ε2 + o(ε2), (3.16)
where ΓQ
∗
(Qi) is defined as in (3.7) and
ΛQ
∗
(i,Q) := ft(0, i, Qi) +Qi ·
(
2G(Q∗) + ΓQ
∗
(Q)
)
. (3.17)
The proof of Lemma 3.2 is relegated to Appendix A.2.
Remark 3.2. By Taylor’s theorem, f(·, i,q) ∈ C1 readily implies
r(t, ε; i,q) = o(ε), for each (t, i,q). (3.18)
Hence, there obviously exist a sequence {εk}k∈N with εk ↓ 0, depending on (t, i,q), such that
r(t, εk; i,q)/εk decreases to 0. In view of this, (3.15) is slightly stronger than “f(·, i,q) ∈ C1 for all
(i,q)”: it requires r(t, εk; i,q)/εk to decrease for any arbitrary {εk}k∈N with εk ↓ 0.
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Remark 3.3. Under non-exponential discounting as in (2.6), all conditions imposed in Lemma 3.2
boil down to mild conditions on the discount function δ:
• By Remark 3.1, “f satisfies (2.3)” reduces to (3.8).
• “f(·, i,q) ∈ C1 with ft satisfying (2.3)” amounts to
δ ∈ C1 and
∫ ∞
0
δ′(t)dt <∞; (3.19)
• “r(t, ε; i,q) satisfies (3.5)” reduces to ∫∞0 |δ(t + ε)− (δ(t) + εδ′(t))|dt <∞. Note that this is
always true under (3.8) and (3.19); recall from Remark 3.1 that (3.8) implies (3.9).
• “ r(t,ε;i,q)ε increasing in ε, for all (t, i,q)” boils down to∣∣∣∣δ(t+ ε)− δ(t)ε − δ′(t)
∣∣∣∣ increasing in ε, ∀t ≥ 0. (3.20)
A useful sufficient condition for (3.20) is δ being convex.
Hence, conditions imposed in Lemma 3.2 reduce to (3.8), (3.19), and (3.20). This already cov-
ers many commonly-seen non-exponential discount functions, including generalized hyperbolic and
pseudo-exponential as mentioned in Remark 3.1.
The second-order expansion in Lemma 3.2 provides a straightforward sufficient condition for
strong equilibria. It will be useful to show the existence of strong equilibria (Theorem 3.3 below),
as well as to find strong equilibria explicitly in examples of Section 4. Interestingly, the condition
itself relates solely to the first-order term, yet the derivation of it involves the second-order term.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose f satisfies the conditions specified in Lemma 3.2. For any Q∗ ∈ Q, if
ΓQ
∗
(Q∗i ) > Γ
Q∗(Qi) for all i ∈ S and Q ∈ Q with Qi 6= Q∗i , (3.21)
then Q∗ is a strong equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 3.2 is relegated to Appendix A.3.
In general, a weak equilibrium Q∗ ∈ Q may satisfy (3.10) with equality for some i ∈ S and
Q ∈ Q with Qi 6= Q∗i . In this case, Proposition 3.2 is inconclusive. To further examine if Q∗ ∈ Q
is a strong equilibrium, one needs to analyze the second-order term in (3.16) carefully.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose f satisfies the conditions specified in Lemma 3.2. Let Q∗ ∈ Q be a weak
equilibrium. Consider
R := {(i,Q) ∈ S ×Q \ {Q∗} : ΓQ∗(Q∗i ) = ΓQ
∗
(Qi)}. (3.22)
If ΛQ
∗
(i,Q∗) > ΛQ
∗
(i,Q) for all (i,Q) ∈ R, then Q∗ is a strong equilibrium. If ΛQ∗(i,Q∗) <
ΛQ
∗
(i,Q) for some (i,Q) ∈ R, then Q∗ is not a strong equilibrium.
Proof. Given (i,Q) ∈ Rc, Theorem 3.1 implies ΓQ∗(Q∗i ) > ΓQ
∗
(Qi). Then, (3.6) readily shows that
F (i,Q∗)− F (i,Q⊗ε Q∗) > 0 as ε > 0 small enough. Given (i,Q) ∈ R, Lemma 3.2 implies
F (i,Q∗)− F (i,Q⊗ε Q∗)
ε2
=
1
2
(
ΛQ
∗
(i,Q∗)− ΛQ∗(i,Q)
)
+ o(1). (3.23)
If ΛQ
∗
(i,Q∗) > ΛQ
∗
(i,Q) for all (i,Q) ∈ R, (3.23) shows that F (i,Q∗)−F (i,Q⊗εQ∗) > 0 as ε > 0
small enough, for all (i,Q) ∈ R. Thus, Q∗ is a strong equilibrium. If ΛQ∗(i,Q∗) < ΛQ∗(i,Q) for
some (i,Q) ∈ R, (3.23) implies F (i,Q∗)− F (i,Q⊗ε Q∗) < 0 for ε > 0 small enough, showing that
Q∗ is not a strong equilibrium.
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In view of Proposition 3.3, there is the inconclusive case where ΛQ
∗
(i,Q∗) ≥ ΛQ∗(i,Q) for all
(i,Q) ∈ R and ΛQ∗(i,Q∗) = ΛQ∗(i,Q) for some (i,Q) ∈ R. To resolve this, one needs to upgrade
Proposition 3.3 further, with a higher-order expansion. Repeating this line of reasoning leads to
the following characterization of strong equilibria.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose there exist functions Ln : S ×Q×Q → R, n ∈ N, such that as ε ↓ 0,
F (i,Q∗)− F (i,Q⊗ε Q∗) =
∞∑
n=1
Ln(i,Q,Q
∗)εn, ∀i ∈ S and Q,Q∗ ∈ Q. (3.24)
Then, Q∗ ∈ Q is a strong equilibrium if and only if for any (i,Q) ∈ S × Q, one of the following
holds:
(i) ∃ n∗ = n∗(i,Q) ∈ N such that Ln(i,Q,Q∗) = 0 for all n < n∗ and Ln∗(i,Q,Q∗) > 0;
(ii) Ln(i,Q,Q
∗) = 0 for all n ∈ N.
Proof. Let Q∗ ∈ Q be a strong equilibrium. By contradiction, suppose there exists (i,Q) ∈ S ×Q
such that neither (i) nor (ii) holds. Then, there must exist nˆ ∈ N such that Ln(i,Q,Q∗) = 0 for all
n < nˆ and Lnˆ(i,Q,Q
∗) < 0. Consequently, (3.24) yields
F (i,Q∗)− F (i,Q ⊗ε Q∗)
εnˆ
= Lnˆ(i,Q,Q
∗) + o(1). (3.25)
With Lnˆ(i,Q,Q
∗) < 0 , F (i,Q∗) < F (i,Q⊗εQ∗) for ε > 0 small enough. This contradicts Q∗ being
a strong equilibrium. On the other hand, suppose either (i) or (ii) holds for any (i,Q) ∈ S×Q. If (i)
holds, (3.24) yields (3.25), with nˆ replaced by n∗. With Ln∗(i,Q,Q
∗) > 0, F (i,Q∗) > F (i,Q⊗εQ∗)
for ε > 0 small enough. If (ii) holds, (3.24) implies F (i,Q∗) = F (i,Q⊗εQ∗) for ε > 0 small enough.
This shows that Q∗ is a strong equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 together provide a machinery for finding strong equilibria.
First, one uses Proposition 3.1 to find weak equilibria. Theorem 3.2 comes into play next, when
one wants to determine if a weak equilibrium Q∗ ∈ Q is in fact strong. In principle, one can derive
higher-order expansions for F (i,Q∗) − F (i,Q ⊗ε Q∗) to check whether (i) or (ii) in Theorem 3.2
holds. Such derivations, in practice, can be quite technical and complicated, as shown in the proof
of Lemma 3.2 (even for the second-order expansion).
Since the main focus of this paper is to introduce and motivate the new notion of strong
equilibria, we will not pursue expanding F (i,Q∗) − F (i,Q ⊗ε Q∗) any further. As we will see in
Section 4, the second-order expansion in Lemma 3.2 already allows explicit demonstrations of how
strong and weak equilibria can differ, and why the strong notion is needed.
3.2 General Existence of Equilibria under Compactness
While one can use Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 to search for weak and strong equilibria, as
discussed below Theorem 3.2, this machinery does not assert a priori whether an equilibrium exists.
It is therefore of interest to establish a general existence result for equilibria. This can be done by
additional compactness assumption on admissible sets.
Theorem 3.3. Suppose that Di in (2.1) is a convex compact set for all i ∈ S, and f satisfies
(2.3) with f(0, i, ·) being concave for all i ∈ S. Then, there exists a weak equilibrium. If we
assume additionally that f(0, i, ·) is strictly concave for all i ∈ S and f satisfies the conditions in
Lemma 3.2, then there exists a strong equilibrium.
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The proof of Theorem 3.3 is relegated to Appendix A.4.
Remark 3.4. Without compactness of Di, the existence of an equilibrium, weak or strong, does
not hold in general, even when f(0, i, ·) is concave. For instance, consider S = {1, 2}, f(t, 1, ·) ≡ 0,
f(t, 2, ·) ≡ e−t, and Di = Ei for i = 1, 2, i.e. no constraint at all for the generator Q = (qij)i,j=1,2.
For any fixed Q∗ ∈ Q, by the definition of f , we have F (1, Q∗) < F (2, Q∗) and (3.10) reads
q12 (F (2, Q
∗)− F (1, Q∗)) ≤ q∗12 (F (2, Q∗)− F (1, Q∗)) for i = 1.
This ineqaulity is violated as long as q12 > q
∗
12. That is, (3.10) does not hold for all i ∈ S and Q ∈ Q,
which precludes the existence of any weak (and thus strong) equilibrium, thanks to Theorem 3.1.
When each Di is convex and closed, but need not be bounded, we consider, for each C > 0, the
bounded set DCi := {q ∈ Di : ||q|| ≤ C} and the corresponding set of generators
QC := {Q ∈ Q : Qi ∈ DCi , ∀i ∈ S}.
Applying Theorem 3.3 to QC gives the following result.
Corollary 3.1. Suppose f satisfies (2.3) and f(0, i, ·) is concave (resp. strictly concave) for all
i ∈ S. For any C > 0, there exists Q∗C ∈ QC such that (3.10) holds for all (i,Q) ∈ S × QC .
Furthermore, if there is C > 0 such that ‖(Q∗C)i‖ < C for all i ∈ S, then Q∗C is a weak (resp.
strong) equilibrium.
4 A Two-State Model
In this section, we focus on a tractable two-state model under non-exponential discounting. Our
goal is to demonstrate explicitly how theoretic results in Section 3 can be used to find weak and
strong equilibria, and how these two types of equilibria can differ from each other.
Take S = {1, 2} and Di = Ei for i = 1, 2. Any generator Q ∈ Q is then of the form
Q =
[−a a
b −b
]
, a, b ≥ 0. (4.1)
We will denote this by Q ∼ (a, b). Consider the pseudo-exponential discount function
δ(t) = λe−ρt + (1− λ)e−ρ′t t ≥ 0, (4.2)
where λ ∈ (0, 1) and ρ, ρ′ ≥ 0 are given constants. Assume that
f(t, 1, (−a, a)) = δ(t)g1(a) and f(t, 2, (b,−b)) = δ(t)g2(b),
for some given measurable functions g1 and g2. Given Q ∼ (a, b), we will write F (i,Q) and G(i,Q)
as Fi(a, b) and Gi(a, b), respectively, for i = 1, 2. Observe that the transition probability of X,
under Q ∼ (a, b), is given by[
P11(t) P12(t)
P21(t) P22(t)
]
=
[
α+ βe−γt β − βe−γt
α− αe−γt β + αe−γt
]
,
where
α :=
b
a+ b
, β :=
a
a+ b
, γ := a+ b.
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Hence, we can calculate that for i = 1, 2,
Fi(a, b) = λF
ρ
i (a, b) + (1− λ)F ρ
′
i (a, b),
Gi(a, b) = −ρλF ρi (a, b)− ρ′(1− λ)F ρ
′
i (a, b),
where
Fφ1 (a, b) :=
(
α
φ
+
β
φ+ γ
)
g1(a) +
(
β
φ
− β
φ+ γ
)
g2(b), for φ = ρ, ρ
′
Fφ2 (a, b) :=
(
α
φ
− α
φ+ γ
)
g1(a) +
(
β
φ
+
α
φ+ γ
)
g2(b), for φ = ρ, ρ
′.
Therefore,
F1(a, b) − F2(a, b) =
(
λ
ρ+ a+ b
+
1− λ
ρ′ + a+ b
)
(g1(a)− g2(b)), (4.3)
G1(a, b) −G2(a, b) = −
(
ρλ
ρ+ a+ b
+
ρ′(1− λ)
ρ′ + a+ b
)
(g1(a)− g2(b)). (4.4)
It follows that for any Q ∼ (a, b) and Q∗ ∼ (a∗, b∗), ΓQ∗(Qi) defined in (3.7) takes the form
Γ
(a∗,b∗)
1 (a) := Γ
Q∗(Q1) = g1(a)− a (F1(a∗, b∗)− F2(a∗, b∗)) , (4.5)
Γ
(a∗,b∗)
2 (b) := Γ
Q∗(Q2) = g2(b) + b (F1(a
∗, b∗)− F2(a∗, b∗)) . (4.6)
Moreover, ΛQ
∗
(i,Q) defined in (3.17) takes the form
Λ
(a∗,b∗)
1 (a, b) := Λ
Q∗(1, Q) = −2a (G1(a∗, b∗)−G2(a∗, b∗))− a (g1(a)− g2(b))
− (ρλ+ ρ′(1− λ))g1(a) + (a2 + ab) (F1(a∗, b∗)− F2(a∗, b∗)) , (4.7)
Λ
(a∗,b∗)
2 (a, b) := Λ
Q∗(2, Q) = 2b (G1(a
∗, b∗)−G2(a∗, b∗)) + b (g1(a)− g2(b))
− (ρλ+ ρ′(1− λ))g2(b)− (b2 + ab) (F1(a∗, b∗)− F2(a∗, b∗)) . (4.8)
The next example shows how Proposition 3.1 can be a convenient tool to find weak equilibria.
Other results in Section 3 can then be applied to check if a weak equilibrium is actually strong.
Example 4.1. Let λ = 12 , ρ = 1, ρ
′ = 2, g1(a) = −a2, g2(b) = 2− (1 − b)2. By Proposition 3.1,
Q ∼ (a, b) is a weak equilibrium if and only if the following holds: (i) if a, b > 0, we have
g′1(a) + F2(a, b)− F1(a, b) = 0, (4.9)
g′2(b) + F1(a, b)− F2(a, b) = 0, (4.10)
and (ii) if a = 0 (resp. b = 0), then “≤” holds in (4.9) (resp. (4.10)). Thanks to (4.3), the above
equations admits a unique solution (a∗, b∗) = ( 512 ,
7
12 ). That is, Q
∗ ∼ ( 512 , 712) is the unique weak
equilibrium. By Theorem 3.1, a∗ and b∗ are maximizers of Γ
(a∗,b∗)
1 (a) and Γ
(a∗,b∗)
2 (b), respectively;
recall (4.5) and (4.6). By the strict concavity of g1 and g2, a
∗ and b∗ are in fact the unique maxi-
mizers. This shows that Q∗ ∼ ( 512 , 712 ) is actually a strong equilibrium, thanks to Proposition 3.2.
An equilibrium can reside on the boundary of an admissible set, as the next example shows.
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Example 4.2. Let λ = 12 , ρ = 1, ρ
′ = 2, g1(a) = −a2, g2(b) = 2 − b2. Using Proposition 3.1
as in Example 4.1, we obtain a unique weak equilibrium Q∗ ∼ (a∗, 0), where a∗ > 0 is the unique
solution to
−2a+ 1
2
(
1
a+ 1
+
1
a+ 2
)
(a2 + 2) = 0.
By the strict concavity of g1 and g2, the same argument in Example 4.1 shows that Q
∗ ∼ (a∗, 0) is
in fact a strong equilibrium.
In the above two examples, weak equilibria are also strong, thanks to the strict concavity of g1
and g2. In general, a weak equilibrium may not be strong, and determining whether it is strong can
be much more involved than applying Proposition 3.2. This is demonstrated in the next example,
where two equilibria co-exist: one is a weak equilibrium that is not strong; the other is strong.
Example 4.3. Let λ = 12 , ρ = 1, ρ
′ = 2, g1(a) = −a2, and
g2(b) =
{
193
144 +
5
6b, for b <
7
12 ;
2− (1− b)2, for b ≥ 712 .
Note that g2 is concave and C1 on [0,∞), but strictly concave only on ( 712 ,∞).
First, we claim that (a∗, b∗) = ( 512 ,
7
12 ) obtained in Example 4.1 is still a weak equilibrium under
current setting. Indeed, by (4.5), (4.6) and (4.3),
Γ
(a∗,b∗)
1 (a) = g1(a)− a
(
λ
ρ+ a∗ + b∗
+
1− λ
ρ′ + a∗ + b∗
)
(g1(a
∗)− g2(b∗)) = −a2 + 5
6
a,
Γ
(a∗,b∗)
2 (b) = g2(b) + b
(
λ
ρ+ a∗ + b∗
+
1− λ
ρ′ + a∗ + b∗
)
(g1(a
∗)− g2(b∗)) = g2(b)− 5
6
b
=
{
193
144 , if b <
7
12 ;
− (b2 − 712)+ 193144 , if b ≥ 712 . ,
This shows that Γ
(a∗,b∗)
1 (a) is maximized uniquely at a = a
∗, while
argmax
b≥0
Γ
(a∗,b∗)
2 (b) = [0, 7/12]. (4.11)
By Theorem 3.1, this already implies that Q∗ ∼ (a∗, b∗) is a weak equilibrium.
As opposed to Examples 4.1 and 4.2, whether Q∗ is a strong equilibrium cannot be concluded
by Proposition 3.2, as b∗ = 712 is not a unique maximizer in (4.11). We will instead resort to
Proposition 3.3. With the aid of (4.3) and (4.4), we deduce from (4.8) that
Λ
(a∗,b∗)
2 (a
∗, b)
= b
[
−2
(
ρλ
ρ+ a∗ + b∗
+
ρ′(1− λ)
ρ′ + a∗ + b∗
)
− (a∗ + b)
(
λ
ρ+ a∗ + b∗
+
1− λ
ρ′ + a∗ + b∗
)]
(g1(a
∗)− g2(b∗))
+ b(g1(a
∗)− g2(b)) − (ρλ+ ρ′(1− λ))g2(b)
= b
[
7
3
+
5
6
(
b+
5
12
)]
− 25
144
b−
(
b+
3
2
)
g2(b) = − 1
12
b− 579
288
, for b ≤ 7
12
.
This shows that
Λ
(a∗,b∗)
2 (a
∗, b∗) < Λ
(a∗,b∗)
2 (a
∗, b), ∀b ∈ [0, 7/12). (4.12)
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For any Q ∼ (a∗, b) with b ∈ [0, 7/12), (4.11) and (4.12) imply that (2, Q) ∈ R (recall (3.22)) and
ΛQ
∗
(2, Q∗) < ΛQ
∗
(2, Q). By Proposition 3.3, Q∗ ∼ (a∗, b∗) is not a strong equilibrium.
Now, when using Proposition 3.1 to find weak equilibria, if we take b = 0, (4.9) and (4.10)
become
5
6
≤ 2a = 1
2
(
1
1 + a
+
1
2 + a
)(
a2 +
193
144
)
. (4.13)
This admits a unique solution a¯ ∈ [0,∞) (numerical computation shows a¯ ≈ 0.42364). By (4.13),
Γ
(a¯,0)
1 (a) = −a2 + 2a¯a = −a(a− 2a¯), and Γ(a¯,0)2 (b) =
193
144
+
(
5
6
− 2a¯
)
b.
This shows that a = a¯ (resp. b = 0) is the unique maximizer of Γ
(a¯,0)
1 (a) (resp. Γ
(a¯,0)
2 (b)). Hence,
Q¯∗ ∼ (a¯, 0) is a strong equilibrium, thanks to Proposition 3.2.
Remark 4.1. In the above example, for any Q ∼ (a∗, b) with b ∈ [0, 7/12), we deduce from (4.11),
(4.12), and the second-order expansion in Lemma 3.2 that
F (2, Q∗) < F (2, Q⊗ε Q∗), for all ε > 0 small enough.
This shows that, although Q∗ ∼ (a∗, b∗) is a weak equilibrium, there is incentive to deviate from Q∗
at state 2: deviating to Q, in a however small interval [0, ε], yields a larger payoff than sticking to
Q∗. This reminds us of Remark 2.2, and indicates the need for the notion of strong equilibria.
4.1 Application to Machinery Management
A machine is any mechanical or electrical device that converts input energy to useful output energy
or work. In the good state, where the machine functions properly, there is a tradeoff between
achieving maximal efficiency and reducing tear and wear. While one intends to exert input energy
intensely enough to maximize the payoff generated by the machine, more intense use of the machine
will bring about the bad state, where the machine is out of order, more easily. In the bad state,
one spends effort repairing the machine. There is again a tradeoff: the more intensely the effort is
spent, the faster the good state can be restored; yet, at the same time, the faster costs accumulate.
All these considerations of machinery management can be well encoded in our two-state model.
Take Example 4.1 for instance. Let i = 1 be the bad state and i = 2 be the good state. For any
Q ∼ (a, b), a ≥ 0 represents how intensely effort is spent on repairing the machine (in state 1), and
b ≥ 0 stands for how intensely the machine is used (in state 2). In view of (4.1), the larger a ≥ 0
(i.e. the more intensely effort is spent), the faster (on average) the machine will function again (i.e.
the state will switch from 1 to 2). The payoff function g1(a) = −a2, however, shows that the cost
of repair grows quickly with the intensity of effort. Similarly, in view of (4.1), the smaller b ≥ 0
(i.e. the less intensely the machine is used), the less likely the machine will break down (i.e. the
state will switch from 2 to 1). Leaving the machine idle (i.e. b = 0), however, may not be the best
choice in view of the payoff function g2(b) = 2− (1− b)2. As the intensity of input energy increases
(i.e. b ≥ 0 increases), the instantaneous payoff g2(b) first increases to its maximal level g2(1) = 2 at
b = 1, and then decreases indefinitely. Thus, one may want to choose b ≥ 0 closer to 1 to possibly
enlarge the cumulative payoff.
In a factory or a company, how a machine should be managed, i.e. how Q ∼ (a, b) should
be specified, is often decided by a group of professional workers, instead of one single individual.
In such group decision making, pseudo-exponential discounting is typically used. Its most basic
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form is (4.2), which is the discount function for a group that involves two individuals (or cohorts)
who discount exponentially at different rates ρ and ρ′, respectively, with λ ∈ (0, 1) determined by
the sizes or influence of the cohorts. In other words, the derivation in Example 4.1 amounts to
finding a management plan for a machine—how hard it should be used and repaired—that will be
consistently carried out over time. It turns out that only Q∗ ∼ ( 512 , 712 ) is such a time-consistent
management plan.
5 The Discrete-Time Case
In this section, we study the discrete-time model corresponding to that in Section 2. The purpose is
twofold. First, when time horizon is infinite, little is known about the existence and characterization
of equilibria, even in discrete time. Arguments from Section 3 can be applied here to shed new light
on this. Our second focus is the convergence of discrete-time equilibria to their continuous-time
counterparts, as the mesh size in time diminishes. As we will see, when discrete-time equilibria
converge, they always converge to a weak equilibrium, which, however, need not be strong.
Let X = (Xt)t=0,1,... be a time-homogeneous discrete-time Markov chain taking values in S :=
{1, 2, . . . , N} for some N ∈ N, and take N¯ := {0, 1, 2, ...}. The transition matrix u = (uij)i,j=1,... ,N
of X is to be controlled. Let P be the set of probability measures defined on S, i.e.
P :=
{
α = (α1, . . . , αN ) ∈ RN+ :
∑
i=1,...,N
αi = 1
}
. (5.1)
Consider a continuous function κ : N¯×S×P→ R. For any (t, i, α) ∈ N¯×S×P, κ(t, i, α) represents
the payoff at time t, given that Xt = i and ui = α, where ui denotes the i
th row of u. Assume that
∞∑
t=0
(
sup
(i,α)∈S×P
|κ(t, i, α)|
)
<∞. (5.2)
Let Ai ⊆ P be the set of admissible transitional probabilities when X is at the state i. Define
A := {u ∈ RN×N : ui ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ S}.
For any i ∈ S and u ∈ A, (5.2) guarantees that the expected payoff
V (i, u) := Ei,u
[ ∞∑
t=0
κ(t,Xt, uXt)
]
<∞ (5.3)
is well-defined, where Ei,u denotes the expectation conditioned on X0 = i and the transition matrix
of X being u. We will write Ei for Ei,u whenever there is no confusion about u.
For any u, u∗ ∈ A, we introduce the concatenation of u and u∗ at time 1, denoted by u⊗1 u∗.
Using this concatenated matrix means that the evolution of X is governed by u at time 0, and then
by u∗ at all subsequent time points. Given an initial state i ∈ S, the expected value is then
V (i, u ⊗1 u∗) = κ(0, i, ui) +
N∑
j=1
(
Ej,u∗
[
∞∑
t=0
κ(t+ 1,Xt, u
∗
Xt)
]
· uij
)
. (5.4)
Definition 5.1. u∗ ∈ A is called an equilibrium if, for any (i, u) ∈ S×A, V (i, u∗) ≥ V (i, u⊗1 u∗).
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Remark 5.1. A strong equilibrium (Definition 2.2) parallels the above discrete-time definition,
and admits a clear economic interpretation, as explained in Remark 2.2. By contrast, the precise
interpretation of a weak equilibrium (Definition 2.1) is not so clear in the literature.
A handy characterization of equilibria can be established, by following the arguments in Propo-
sition 3.1. To this end, for any i ∈ S and u ∈ A, define
Hi(u) := Ei,u
[
∞∑
t=0
κ(t+ 1,Xt, uXt)
]
and H(u) := (H1(u), . . . ,HN (u)). (5.5)
For any differentiable function v : P 7→ R, let ∇v(α) be the gradient of v evaluated at α ∈ P,
and ∂nv(α) be the n
th component of ∇v(α). Also recall T in (3.12). Proposition 5.1 below can be
proved by following line by line the proof of Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 5.1. Let κ(0, i, ·) be C1 for all i ∈ S. If u∗ ∈ A be an equilibrium, then for any i ∈ S,
(∇κ(0, i, u∗i ) +H(u∗)) · λ ≤ 0, ∀λ ∈ T s.t. u∗i + ελ ∈ Ai for ε > 0 small enough. (5.6)
In particular, if u∗i is a relative interior point of Ai, then
∂nκ(0, i, u
∗
i ) +Hn(u
∗) = ∂mκ(0, i, u
∗
i ) +Hm(u
∗), n,m = 1, . . . , N.
Furthermore, if κ(0, i, ·) is additionally concave for any i ∈ S, then the converse is also true; that
is, u∗ is an equilibrium if and only if (5.6) holds.
To establish the existence of equilibria, arguments used to prove Theorem 3.3 can also be applied
here. Since P in (5.1) is by definition compact, we no longer need the compactness assumption in
Theorem 3.3, leading to the following very general existence result.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose Ai is convex and closed, and κ(0, i, ·) is concave, for all i ∈ S. Then, there
exists an equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 is relegated to Appendix B.1.
Remark 5.2. If κ(0, i, ·) is not concave, then in general an equilibrium may not exist. For instance,
take S = {1, 2} and denote any transition matrix
u =
[
1− α α
β 1− β
]
, α, β ∈ [0, 1] (5.7)
by u ∼ (α, β). Let δ(0) = 1 and δ(t) = k · λt−1 for t ∈ N, where k ∈ (0, 1) is a constant. Consider
κ(t, 1, u1) = δ(t)g1(α) and κ(t, 2, u1) = δ(t)g2(β),
where
g1(α) := −7
8
√
α and g2(β) := 2−
√
1− β,
which are strictly convex. Given u∗ ∼ (α∗, β∗) and u ∼ (α, β), direct calculation shows
V1(α) := V (1, u ⊗1 u∗) = g1(α) +H1(u∗) · (1− α) +H2(u∗) · α,
V2(β) := V (2, u ⊗1 u∗) = g2(β) +H1(u∗) · β +H2(u∗) · (1− β).
If u∗ ∼ (α∗, β∗) is an equilibrium, V1(α) and V2(β) attain maximums at α = α∗ and β = β∗,
respectively. The strict convexity of g1 and g2 implies α
∗, β∗ ∈ {0, 1}. If u∗ ∼ (0, 0), then H1(u∗) =
0 and H2(u
∗) = 32 , and thus V1(α) = −78
√
α+ 32α. But, V1(0) = 0 < V1(1) =
5
8 implies (0, 0) cannot
be an equilibrium. Similar calculation shows none of (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) is an equilibrium.
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5.1 Convergence to Continuous Time
Recall the continuous-time setup in Section 2. For the continuous-time payoff function f , we further
assume that there exists T > 0, independent of i and q, such that
t 7→ |f(t, i,q)| is nonincreasing, for t ≥ T . (5.8)
Take (δn)n∈N in R with δn ↓ 0. For each n ∈ N, define κn : N¯× S ×P→ R by
κn(k, i, α) := f(kδn, i, α˜
i,n) · δn, (5.9)
where
α˜i,n :=
1
δn
(α1, . . . , αi−1, αi − 1, αi+1, . . . , αN ),
for each α = (α1, . . . , αN ) ∈ P. For any transition matrix u, define the generator Qu,n = (qu,nij ) by
qu,nij :=
{
1
δn
uij , j 6= i,
1
δn
(uii − 1), j = i.
(5.10)
Then, we introduce
An := {u transition matrix : Qu,n ∈ Q}. (5.11)
For each n ∈ N, consider the discretized problem V n given by (5.3), with κ and A replaced by
κn and An. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium un ∈ An, i.e. V n(i, un) ≥ V n(i, u ⊗1 un) for
all i ∈ S and u ∈ An. Following the notation in (5.5), this means for any i ∈ S and u ∈ An,
κn(0, i, uni ) +H
n(un) · uni ≥ κn(0, i, ui) +Hn(un) · ui, (5.12)
where Hn is defined as in (5.5) with κ replaced by κn, i.e.
Hni (u
n) := Ei,un
[
∞∑
k=0
κn(k + 1,Xk, u
n
Xk
)
]
, ∀i ∈ S. (5.13)
In the following, we will write
Qn := Qu
n,n ∈ Q.
for simplicity. The main convergence result is the following.
Theorem 5.2. Assume (2.3), (5.8), and that f(·, i, ·) is continuous for all i ∈ S. If there exists
Q∗ ∈ Q such that (up to a subsequence) Qn → Q∗, then Q∗ satisfies (3.10) for all (i,Q) ∈ S ×Q.
That is, Q∗ is a weak equilibrium (under Definition 2.1).
Remark 5.3. Suppose that for the continuous-time problem F in (2.4), Di is a closed convex set
and f(0, i, ·) is concave for all i ∈ S. Then, in view of (5.9) and (5.11), Theorem 5.1 implies that
an equilibrium un ∈ An exists for the discretized problem V n, for all n ∈ N. If we further assume
that Di is bounded for all i ∈ S, then (Qn)n∈N is pre-compact. Then, by Theorem 5.2, any limit
point of (Qn)n∈N is a weak equilibrium (under Definition 2.1).
To establish Theorem 5.2, we need the following technical lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Assume (2.3), (5.8), and that f(·, i, ·) is continuous for all i ∈ S. If there exists
Q∗ ∈ Q such that (up to a subsequence) Qn → Q∗, then for any i ∈ S,
Hni (u
n)→ Fi(Q∗) = Ei,Q∗
[∫ ∞
0
f(t,Xt, Q
∗
Xt)dt
]
as n→∞.
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The proof of Lemma 5.1 is relegated to Appendix B.2.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. For any i ∈ S and u ∈ An, (5.12) can be re-written as
f(0, i, Qni ) · δn +
∑
j 6=i
Hnj (u
n) · unij +Hni (un)(unii − 1)
≥ f(0, i, Qu,ni ) · δn +
∑
j 6=i
Hnj (u
n) · uij +Hni (un)(uii − 1).
Dividing both sides by δn yields
f(0, i, Qni ) +
∑
j 6=i
Hnj (u
n) · qnij +Hni (un) · qnii ≥ f(0, i, Qu,ni ) +
∑
j 6=i
Hnj (u
n) · qu,nij +Hni (un) · qu,nii ,
which is equivalent to f(0, i, Qni )+H
n(un) ·Qni ≥ f(0, i, Qi)+Hn(un) ·Qi. Thanks to the continuity
of f(0, i, ·) and Lemma 5.1, sending n→∞ gives (3.10).
In general, the limit point Q∗ in Theorem 5.2 need not be a strong equilibrium. This is demon-
strated in the next example: the equilibria for discretized problems converge uniquely to a weak
equilibrium for the continuous-time problem, but this weak equilibrium is not strong.
Example 5.1. Consider the two-state model in Section 4. Take λ = 12 , ρ = 1, ρ
′ = 2,
g2(b) ≡ 0 and g1(a) = −1
4
a4 + ka3 − k2a2 − 3
4
a− 1,
where k > 0 is a constant. Note that g′1(a) = −a(a− k)(a− 2k)− 34 and g1(0) = −1.
First, we show that Q∗ ∼ (0, 0) is a weak equilibrium that is not strong. By (4.3), F1(0, 0) −
F2(0, 0) =
3
4g1(0) = −34 . Then, for any Q ∼ (a, b), (4.5) and (4.6) imply
ΓQ
∗
(Q1) = g1(a) +
3
4
a and ΓQ
∗
(Q2) = −3
4
b.
This shows that ΓQ
∗
(Q1) (resp. Γ
Q∗(Q2)) is maximized at a = 0 and a = 2k (resp. at b = 0).
Hence, Theorem 3.1 readily implies Q∗ ∼ (0, 0) is a weak equilibrium. On the other hand, consider
Qˆ ∼ (2k, 0). Note that ΓQ∗(Q∗1) = ΓQ
∗
(Qˆ1), and direct calculation shows
ΛQ
∗
(1, Q∗) =
3
2
<
33
4
k +
3
2
= ΛQ
∗
(1, Qˆ),
thanks to (4.4) and (4.7). Thus, by Proposition 3.3, Q∗ ∼ (0, 0) is not a strong equilibrium.
Now, consider the discretized problems. Denote by u ∼ (α, β) the transition matrix given as in
(5.7). For each h > 0, consider the discretized problem V h as in (5.3), where κ is replaced by
κh(n, 1, u1) = δ(nh)g1(α/h)h and κ
h(n, 2, u2) = δ(nh)g2(β/h)h ≡ 0,
with δ(·) as in (4.2). We claim that u∗ ∼ (0, 0) is an equilibrium for V h, for h > 0 small enough.
Fix u ∼ (α, β) 6= (0, 0). Recall (5.3) and (5.4). If β > 0, since g1(0) < 0, we have
V h(2, u ⊗1 u∗) = β
∞∑
n=0
δ((n + 1)h)g1(0)h < 0 = V
h(2, u∗), ∀h > 0. (5.14)
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If α > 0, then using g1(0) = −1,
V h(1, u ⊗1 u∗) = g1(α/h)h + (1− α)
∞∑
n=1
1
2
(e−nh + e−2nh)g1(0)h
= h
[
g1(α/h) +
α
2
∞∑
n=1
(e−nh + e−2nh)− 1
2
∞∑
n=1
(e−nh + e−2nh)
]
.
It can be checked that
∞∑
n=1
e−nh =
1
h
(
1− 1
2
h+ o(h)
)
,
implying
V h(1, u⊗1 u∗) = h
[
g˜(h)− 1
2
∞∑
n=1
(e−nh + e−2nh)
]
,
where g˜(h) := g1(α/h) +
α
h
(
3
4 − 12h+ o(h)
)
. For h > 0 small enough, g˜(h) < g1(α/h) +
3
4
α
h ≤
g1(0) = −1, where the last inequality follows from the fact that a 7→ g1(a) + 34a is maximized at
a = 0 and a = 2k (this was mentioned above when we maximized ΓQ
∗
(Q1)). This yields
V h(1, u⊗1 u∗) < 1
2
∞∑
n=0
(e−nh + e−2nh)g1(0)h = V
h(1, u∗). (5.15)
By (5.14) and (5.15), u∗ ∼ (0, 0) is an equilibrium for V h, for h > 0 small enough. In view of
(5.10), Qh := Qu
∗,h → Q∗ ∼ (0, 0) holds trivially, as Qh ∼ (0, 0) for h > 0 small enough.
It seems somewhat surprising that discrete-time equilibria need not converge to a strong equi-
librium. After all, as observed in Remark 5.1, strong equilibria conceptually parallel discrete-time
equilibria: Definitions 2.2 and 5.1 both require direct dominance in value, instead of indirect dom-
inance via the rate of change in value (as stipulated for weak equilibria in Definition 2.1).
Despite this conceptual resemblance, achieving “direct dominance in value” in continuous time
is much more demanding technically than that in discrete time. For discretized problems, the direct
dominance “V n(i, un) ≥ V n(i, u ⊗1 un)” is simply (5.12). For the continuous-time problem, the
direct dominance “F (i,Q∗) ≥ F (i,Q ⊗ε Q∗) for ε > 0 small enough” amounts to nonnegativity of
(3.16). Crucially, as n → ∞, (5.12) gives nonnegativity of only the first-order term of (3.16) (i.e.
(3.10)), instead of the entire (3.16). That is to say, the very concept “direct dominance in value” is
much harder to achieve in continuous time, thereby posing a technical gap between discrete-time
equilibria and strong equilibria.
Appropriate conditions on the payoff function f can bridge the gap.
Remark 5.4. If q 7→ f(t, i,q) is strictly concave, then the limit point Q∗ in Theorem 5.2 is a
strong equilibrium, thanks to Proposition 3.2.
We demonstrate in the next example that with q 7→ f(t, i,q) being strictly concave, the equi-
libria for discretized problems indeed converge to a strong equilibrium.
Example 5.2. Recall the setting in Example 4.1. Take (δn)n∈N in R with δn ↓ 0, and define κn
and Hni as in (5.9) and (5.13). Given u ∼ (α, β) as in (5.7), we abuse the notation slightly by
writing κn(k, 1, α) = δ(kδn) · g1(α/δn) · δn, κn(k, 2, β) = δ(kδn) · g2(β/δn) · δn, and
Hni (α, β) := Ei,u
[ ∞∑
k=0
κn(k + 1,Xk, uXk)
]
.
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As κn(0, i, ·) is concave, by Proposition 5.1, un ∼ (α, β) is an equilibrium (with respect to κn) if
and only if (α, β) satisfies
(κn(0, 1, α))′ +Hn2 (α, β) −Hn1 (α, β)


≤ 0, α = 0,
= 0, α ∈ (0, 1),
≥ 0, α = 1,
(5.16)
(κn(0, 2, β))′ +Hn1 (α, β) −Hn2 (α, β)


≤ 0, β = 0,
= 0, β ∈ (0, 1),
≥ 0, β = 1,
(5.17)
where the derivatives are taken with respect to α and β, respectively. Direct calculation yields
Hn1 (α, β) −Hn2 (α, β) = (g1(α/δn)− g2(β/δn)) · δn ·
∞∑
k=0
δ((k + 1)δn) · (1− α− β)k.
Then, for δn > 0 small enough, the solution (αn, βn) to (5.16) and (5.17) is given by
αn :=
δ2n
2
(
e−δn
1− e−δn(1− δn) +
e−2δn
1− e−2δn(1− δn)
)
, βn := δn − αn.
In view of (5.10), each discrete-time equilibrium un ∼ (αn, βn) gives rise to the generator Qn ∼(
αn
δn
, βnδn
)
. As n→∞, it can be checked that Qn ∼ (αnδn , βnδn ) converges to Q∗ ∼ ( 512 , 712), which is a
strong equilibrium as shown in Example 4.1.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce the new notion of strong equilibria, as a refinement of the standard
formulation of continuous-time equilibria (which we call weak equilibria). As we have shown, there
are situations where one finds it beneficial to deviate from a weak equilibrium, indicating that this
standard formulation does not correspond perfectly to the equilibrium idea. A strong equilibrium,
by contrast, is defined analogously to a discrete-time equilibrium, and admits an unambiguous
interpretation of no deviation. To elucidate the difference and connection between these two types
of equilibria, we assume that the state process is a continuous-time finite-state Markov chain on an
infinite horizon. This allows us to derive complete characterizations of strong and weak equilibria,
and compare them explicitly in concrete examples. It is of interest to investigate the case where
the state process is a diffusion process, the typical setup in prior literature on time-inconsistent
stochastic control in continuous time. A recent working paper He and Jiang [11] pursues this
direction. In a diffusion model, they observe from several classical time-inconsistent problems that
strong equilibria seem quite elusive. They propose “regular equilibria”, a new class of equilibria
that are slightly weaker than the strong ones, and show that regular equilibria are more tractable.
Still, the existence of strong equilibria in a diffusion model demands further exploration.
In fact, whenever an infinite state space or a finite time horizon is considered, the existence
of equilibria is a genuine issue. Note that the existence proof in Section A.4 requires the set of
admissible controls, i.e. Q, to be compact. In this paper, since Q is finite-dimensional (as a subset
of RN×N ), its compactness can be easily checked and appropriately assumed through closedness
and boundedness. An infinite state space or a finite time horizon, however, renders the set of
admissible controls infinite-dimensional. With no straightforward characterization of compactness
in an infinite-dimensional space, the existence of equilibria is largely obscure.
20
Time-inconsistent stopping problems in continuous time, on the other hand, have not received
much attention until very recently. Interestingly, two distinct formulations of equilibrium stopping
rules emerge from recent developments, and they, in some spirit, correspond to weak and strong
equilibria in the control case. In [4] and [3], the derivative-type operation as in (2.7) is followed
closely to define an equilibrium stopping rule, which corresponds to a weak equilibrium in our case.
On the other hand, [13] and [14] define an equilibrium by comparing the value of sticking to future
selves’ strategy and the value of deviating to another strategy at current time. This is similar to
the comparison in (1.1), and thus in principle closer to a strong equilibrium in our case. It is of
interest to investigate the precise relation between these two types of equilibrium stopping rules,
as what we have done here for strong and weak equilibria.
A Proofs for Section 3
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Since X evolves according to Q on the time interval [0, ε], P(Xε = i | X0 = i) = 1+ qiiε+ o(ε) and
P(Xt = j | X0 = i) = qijε+ o(ε). This, together with (2.3), implies that
F (i,Q ⊗ε Q∗) = Ei
[∫ ε
0
f(t,Xt, QXt)dt
]
+ Fε(i,Q
∗)(1 + qiiε) +
∑
j 6=i
Fε(j,Q
∗)qijε+ o(ε)
= Fε(i,Q
∗) + Ei
[∫ ε
0
f(t,Xt, QXt)dt
]
+ (Fε(Q
∗) ·Qi)ε+ o(ε). (A.1)
Consider
τ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt 6= X0}. (A.2)
Given that X0 = i, recall that τ is exponentially distributed with parameter λ = −qii, and thus
lim
ε↓0
P(τ ≤ ε | X0 = i)
ε
= lim
ε↓0
1− eqiiε
ε
= −qii. (A.3)
Now, observe that
Ei
[
1{τ>ε}
∫ ε
0
f(t,Xt, QXt)dt
]
= Ei
[
1{τ>ε}
∫ ε
0
f(t, i,Qi)dt
]
= P(τ > ε | X0 = i)
∫ ε
0
f(t, i,Qi)dt
= (1 + qiiε+ o(ε))f(s
∗, i, Qi)ε, for some 0 < s
∗ ≤ ε
= (1 + qiiε+ o(ε))(f(0, i, Qi)ε+ o(ε)) = f(0, i, Qi)ε+ o(ε), (A.4)
where the second line is due to (A.3) and the continuity of t 7→ f(t, i,Qi) on [0, ε], and the third
line is from the continuity of t 7→ f(t, i,Qi) at 0 from the right. Let c := supi∈S ‖Qi‖ <∞. Then,∣∣∣∣Ei
[
1{τ≤ε}
∫ ε
0
f(t,Xt, QXt)dt
]∣∣∣∣ ≤
∫ ε
0
(
sup
i∈S, q∈Di, ‖q‖≤c
|f(t, i,q)|
)
dt · P(τ ≤ ε | X0 = i). (A.5)
Thanks to (2.3), the Lebesgue integral on the right hand side of (A.5) is finite and converges to 0
as ε → 0. It then follows from (A.3) that the right hand side of (A.5) is of o(ε). Combining this
and (A.4), we obtain from (A.1) the desired result (3.2).
Now, taking Q = Q∗ in (3.2) gives F (i,Q∗) = Fε(i,Q
∗) + [f(0, i, Q∗i ) + Fε(Q
∗) ·Q∗i ] ε + o(ε).
This, together with (3.2), yields
F (i,Q∗)− F (i,Q⊗ε Q∗) = ([f(0, i, Q∗i ) + Fε(Q∗) ·Q∗i ]− [f(0, i, Qi) + Fε(Q∗) ·Qi])ε+ o(ε).
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Hence, to prove (3.6), it remains to show that Fε(i,Q) = F (i,Q) + o(1) for all i ∈ S. For each
t ≥ 0 and ε > 0, define
H(t, ε) :=
∑
i∈S
h(t, ε, i,Qi) <∞,
where the finiteness follows from S being a finite set. Under (3.3), we have
|Fε(i,Q)− F (i,Q)| ≤ Ei
[∫ ∞
0
h(t, ε;Xt, QXt)dt
]
≤
∫ ∞
0
H(t, ε)dt→ 0, as ε ↓ 0.
where the convergence comes from the dominated convergence theorem and (3.4). Note that the
dominated convergence theorem is applicable here thanks to (3.4) and (3.5).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Since F (i,Q ⊗ε Q∗) = Ei
[∫ ε
0 f(t,Xt, QXt)dt
]
+ Ei
[∫∞
ε f(t,Xt, Q
∗
Xt
)dt
]
, we will deal with the two
terms on the right hand side one-by-one.
To handle E
[∫ ε
0 f(t,Xt, QXt)dt
]
, consider the events A, B, and C that on the interval [0, ε], the
state of X does not change, changes exactly once, and changes twice or more, respectively. Take τ
in (A.2) and recall that it is exponentially distributed with parameter −qii. Thus, P(A) = P(τ >
ε | X0 = i) = eqiiε = 1 + qiiε+ 12q2iiε2 + o(ε2). It follows that
Ei
[∫ ε
0
f(t,Xt, QXt)dt
∣∣∣∣ A
]
P(A) = P(A)
∫ ε
0
f(t, i,Qi)dt
=
(
1 + qiiε+
1
2
q2iiε
2 + o(ε2)
)(∫ ε
0
(f(0, i, Qi) + tft(0, i, Qi)) dt+ o(ε
2)
)
(A.6)
=
(
1 + qiiε+
1
2
q2iiε
2 + o(ε2)
)(
f(0, i, Qi)ε+
1
2
ft(0, i, Qi)ε
2 + o(ε2)
)
= f(0, i, Qi)ε+
(
qiif(0, i, Qi) +
1
2
ft(0, i, Qi)
)
ε2 + o(ε2). (A.7)
Here, (A.6) follows from the estimate∣∣∣∣
∫ ε
0
f(t, i,Qi)dt−
∫ ε
0
(f(0, i, Qi) + tft(0, i, Qi)) dt
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∫ ε
0
r(0, t; i,Qi)dt = εr(0, t(ε); i,Qi), (A.8)
for some 0 < t(ε) < ε. By (3.18), the last term above is o(ε2). On the other hand, let η be the
density function of τ , given that τ ≤ ε. Since P(τ ≤ ℓ | τ ≤ ε) = P(τ≤ℓ)
P(τ≤ε) =
1−eqiiℓ
1−eqiiε for all ℓ ∈ (0, ε],
η(ℓ) =
d
dℓ
(
1− eqiiℓ
1− eqiiε
)
=
−qiieqiiℓ
1− eqiiε , ℓ ∈ (0, ε]. (A.9)
Let τ ′ := inf{t ≥ τ : Xt 6= Xτ}. Observe that B = {τ ≤ ε < τ ′}, and thus
Ei
[∫ ε
0
f(t,Xt, QXt)dt
∣∣∣∣ B
]
P(B)
= P(τ ≤ ε)E
[(∫ τ
0
f(t, i,Qi)dt+
∫ ε
τ
f(t,Xt, QXt)dt
)
P
(
τ ′ > ε | τ)∣∣∣∣ τ ≤ ε
]
= (1− eqiiε)
∑
j 6=i
−qij
qii
∫ ε
0
(∫ ℓ
0
f(t, i,Qi)dt+
∫ ε
ℓ
f(t, j,Qj)dt
)
η(ℓ)eqjj(ε−ℓ)dℓ
=
∑
j 6=i
qij
∫ ε
0
(∫ ℓ
0
f(t, i,Qi)dt+
∫ ε
ℓ
f(t, j,Qj)dt
)
eqiiℓeqjj(ε−ℓ)dℓ,
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where the third line takes advantage of the fact
P(Xτ = j | X0 = i) = −qij/qii ∀j 6= i, (A.10)
while the fourth line follows from (A.9). By estimates similar to (A.8), we get
Ei
[ ∫ ε
0
f(t,Xt, QXt)dt
∣∣∣∣ B
]
P(B) =
∑
j 6=i
qij
∫ ε
0
(f(0, i, Qi)ℓ+ f(0, j,Qj)(ε− ℓ)) dℓ+ o(ε2)
=
1
2
(
− qiif(0, i, Qi) +
∑
j 6=i
qijf(0, j,Qj)
)
ε2 + o(ε2). (A.11)
Thanks to (A.10), we also have the estimate
P(C) = P(τ < ε, τ ′ ∈ (τ, ε] | X0 = i) = P(τ < ε | X0 = i)
∑
j 6=i
−qij
qii
P(τ ′ ∈ (τ, ε] | τ < ε,Xτ = j)
≤ (1− eqiiε)
∑
j 6=i
−qij
qii
(1− eqjjε) = O(ε2). (A.12)
Now, using the fact that
P(Xε = j | X0 = i) =
(
eQε
)
ij
=
(
I +Qε+
1
2
Q2ε2
)
ij
+ o(ε2), ∀i, j ∈ S,
a direct calculation shows
Ei
[∫ ∞
ε
f(t,Xt, Q
∗
Xt)dt
]
= Fε(i,Q
∗) + (Qi · Fε(Q∗))ε+ 1
2
((Q2)i · Fε(Q∗))ε2 + o(ε2).
This, together with (A.7), (A.11), and (A.12), implies
F (i,Q⊗ε Q∗) = Fε(i,Q∗) + (f(0, i, Qi) +Qi · Fε(Q∗))ε
+
1
2
(
ft(0, i, Qi) +Qi · ~f(0, Q) + (Q2)i · Fε(Q∗)
)
ε2 + o(ε2), (A.13)
where ~f(0, Q) := (f(0, 1, Q1), f(0, 2, Q2), ..., f(0, N,QN )). Since ft satisfies (2.3), G(i,Q) is well-
defined. Observe that
lim
ε↓0
∣∣∣∣Fε(i,Q) − (F (i,Q) + εG(i,Q))ε
∣∣∣∣ ≤ limε↓0 Ei
[∫ ∞
0
r(t, ε;Xt, QXt)
ε
dt
]
= 0,
where the equality follows from (3.18) and the dominated convergence theorem, which is applicable
here as r(t, ε; i,q) satisfies (3.5) and (3.15). This shows that
Fε(i,Q) = F (i,Q) + εG(i,Q) + o(ε), (A.14)
and thus we can rewrite (A.13) as
F (i,Q⊗ε Q∗) = Fε(i,Q∗) + (f(0, i, Qi) +Qi · F (Q∗))ε
+
1
2
(
ft(0, i, Qi) +Qi · 2G(Q∗) +Qi · ~f(0, Q) + (Q2)i · F (Q∗)
)
ε2 + o(ε2). (A.15)
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Observe from (3.7) that
Q · ~f(0, Q)T +Q2 · F (Q∗)T = Q ·
(
~f(0, Q)T +Q · F (Q∗)T
)
= Q · ΓQ∗(Q)T ,
where vT denotes the transpose of a vector v ∈ RN . This implies Qi · ~f(0, Q) + (Q2)i · F (Q∗) =
Qi · ΓQ∗(Q). We therefore conclude that
F (i,Q⊗ε Q∗) = Fε(i,Q∗) + ΓQ∗(Qi)ε+ 1
2
(
ft(0, i, Qi) +Qi ·
(
2G(Q∗) + ΓQ
∗
(Q)
))
ε2 + o(ε2).
(A.16)
By taking Q = Q∗ in (A.16), we get the corresponding expansion for F (i,Q∗). Subtracting it from
(A.16) yields (3.16)
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Fix i ∈ S. For any Q ∈ Q with Qi 6= Q∗i , since (3.10) holds with strict inequality, we observe from
(3.11) that F (i,Q∗)− F (i,Q⊗ε Q∗) > 0 as ε > 0 is small enough.
Now, take an arbitrary Q ∈ Q \ {Q∗} such that Qi = Q∗i . Since Q 6= Q∗ but Qi = Q∗i , the
collection S0 := {j ∈ S : Qj 6= Q∗j} must be nonempty. There are two distinct cases.
• Case I: There is ℓ ∈ S0 such that q∗iℓ > 0. With Qi = Q∗i , we deduce from (3.16) and (3.17) that
F (i,Q∗)− F (i,Q⊗ε Q∗)
ε2
=
1
2
Q∗i ·
(
ΓQ
∗
(Q∗)− ΓQ∗(Q)
)
+ o(1)
=
∑
j 6=i
q∗ij
(
ΓQ
∗
(Q∗j )− ΓQ
∗
(Qj)
)
+ o(1). (A.17)
Since (3.21) entails ΓQ
∗
(Q∗j )−ΓQ
∗
(Qj) > 0 for j ∈ S0 and ΓQ∗(Q∗k)−ΓQ
∗
(Qk) = 0 for k ∈ S \S0,
∑
j 6=i
q∗ij
(
ΓQ
∗
(Q∗j)− ΓQ
∗
(Qj)
)
≥ q∗iℓ
(
ΓQ
∗
(Q∗ℓ )− ΓQ
∗
(Qℓ)
)
> 0.
It then follows from (A.17) that F (i,Q∗)− F (i,Q⊗ε Q∗) > 0 as ε > 0 is small enough.
• Case II: q∗ij = 0 for all j ∈ S0. Consider the stopping time τ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ∈ S0}. Note that
τ > 0 as i /∈ S0, and that QXt = Q∗Xt for all t < τ . If there exists ε∗ > 0 such that P(τ ≤ ε∗) = 0,
then F (i,Q ⊗ε Q∗) = F (i,Q∗) for all 0 < ε < ε∗. Therefore, we assume in the following that
P(τ ≤ ε) > 0 for all ε > 0. For any ε > 0,
F (i,Q∗)− F (i,Q⊗ε Q∗)
= Ei
[∫ ∞
0
f(t,Xt, Q
∗
Xt)dt−
∫ ∞
0
f(t,Xt, (Q⊗ε Q∗)Xt)dt
∣∣∣∣ τ ≤ ε
]
P(τ ≤ ε)
= Ei
[∫ ∞
τ
f(t,Xt, Q
∗
Xt)dt−
∫ ∞
τ
f(t,Xt, (Q⊗ε Q∗)Xt)dt
∣∣∣∣ τ ≤ ε
]
P(τ ≤ ε)
= Ei
[∫ ∞
0
f(t+ τ,XXτt , Q
∗
XXτt
)dt−
∫ ∞
0
f(t+ τ,XXτt , (Q⊗ε−τ Q∗)XXτt )dt
∣∣∣∣ τ ≤ ε
]
P(τ ≤ ε)
= Ei [Fτ (Xτ , Q
∗)− Fτ (Xτ , Q⊗ε−τ Q∗) | τ ≤ ε]P(τ ≤ ε),
24
where Fτ is defined as in (3.1) with ε therein replaced by τ .
Consider the distribution function of τ conditioned on τ ≤ ε, i.e. Hε(y) := P(τ ≤ y | τ ≤ ε) > 0,
y ∈ (0, ε]. The above equation can be rewritten as
F (i,Q∗)− F (i,Q ⊗ε Q∗)
= P(τ ≤ ε)
∑
j∈S0
P(Xτ = j)
∫ ε
0
(
Fy(j,Q
∗)− Fy(j,Q⊗ε−y Q∗)
)
dHε(y). (A.18)
By the proof of Lemma 3.2 in Appendix A.2, particularly (A.14), we have
Fy(j,Q
∗)− Fy(j,Q⊗ε−y Q∗)
=
(
F (j,Q∗)− F (j,Q⊗ε−y Q∗)
)
+
(
G(j,Q∗)−G(j,Q ⊗ε−y Q∗)
)
y + o(y)
=
(
ΓQ
∗
(Q∗j)− ΓQ
∗
(Qj)
)
(ε− y) +
(
Γ¯Q
∗
(Q∗j)− Γ¯Q
∗
(Qj)
)
(ε− y)y + o(ε− y) + o(y), (A.19)
where Γ¯Q
∗
(Qi) := ft(0, i, Qi) + Qi · G(Q∗). In the third line above, the first term follows from
(3.6) directly, while the second term is obtained by applying Lemma 3.1 to G, in place of F .
Observe from integration by parts that∫ ε
0
(ε− y)dHε(y) = ε−
∫ ε
0
ydHε(y) =
∫ ε
0
Hε(y)dy. (A.20)
To find a precise asymptotic expansion for
∫ ε
0 H
ε(y)dy, we need to analyze Hε(y) further. Since
q∗ij = 0 for all j ∈ S0, to reach a state j ∈ S0 from the current state i, at least two changes of states
are needed. Specifically, consider τ1 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt 6= i} and τn := inf{t ≥ τn−1 : Xt 6= Xτn−1}
for all n ≥ 2. Let nˆ := inf{n ∈ N : Pi,Q∗(Xτn ∈ S0) > 0} ≥ 2. By direct calculation,
P(τ ≤ ε) = Kεnˆ + o(εnˆ+1), with K :=
∑
jn∈S, jnˆ∈S0
qi,j1 · qj1,j2 · ... · qjnˆ−1,jnˆ > 0. (A.21)
Note that K is strictly positive by the definition of nˆ. We therefore obtain
Hε(y) =
P(τ ≤ y)
P(τ ≤ ε) =
Kynˆ + o(ynˆ+1)
Kεnˆ + o(εnˆ+1)
.
Since Hε(y) ≈ ynˆ
εnˆ
as ε > 0 small, the leading-order term of
∫ ε
0 H
ε(y)dy is
∫ ε
0
ynˆ
εnˆ
dy = εnˆ+1 . This,
together with (A.20), gives∫ ε
0
(ε− y)dHε(y) =
∫ ε
0
Hε(y)dy =
ε
nˆ+ 1
+ o(ε), (A.22)
A calculation similar to (A.20) yields∫ ε
0
(ε− y)ydHε(y) = −ε
∫ ε
0
Hε(y)dy + 2
∫ ε
0
Hε(y)ydy = O(ε2). (A.23)
Now, thanks to (A.19), (A.21), (A.22), and (A.23), we deduce from (A.18) that
F (i,Q∗)− F (i,Q⊗ε Q∗)
=
∑
j∈S0
P(Xτ = j)
(
ΓQ
∗
(Q∗j )− Γ(Qj)
) K
nˆ+ 1
εnˆ+1 +O(εnˆ+2). (A.24)
Since P(τ ≤ ε) > 0, there must exist j ∈ S0 such that P(Xτ = j) > 0. Also, recall that (3.21)
implies ΓQ
∗
(Q∗j ) − Γ(Qj) > 0 for all j ∈ S0. Hence, the constant in front of εnˆ+1 in (A.24) is
strictly positive, which implies that F (i,Q∗)− F (i,Q ⊗ε Q∗) > 0 as ε > 0 small enough.
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We have shown that for any i ∈ S and Q ∈ Q, F (i,Q∗)−F (i,Q⊗εQ∗) ≥ 0 as ε > 0 small enough.
That is, Q∗ is a strong equilibrium.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Define the set-valued map Φ : Q → 2Q by
Φ(Q) :=
{
R ∈ Q : Ri ∈ argmax
q∈Di
[f(0, i,q) + F (Q) · q] , ∀i ∈ S
}
.
For each Q ∈ Q, the compactness of Di and the continuity of the map q 7→ f(0, i,q) + F (Q) · q,
for all i ∈ S, imply that Φ(Q) 6= ∅. The same continuity also gives the closedness of Φ(Q). On the
other hand, by the concavity of q 7→ f(0, i,q), Φ(Q) is convex.
Next, we show that Φ is upper semicontinuous. Since Di is compact for all i ∈ S, Q is also
compact. The upper semicontinuity of Φ is then equivalent to the sequential characterization: for
any {Rn}n∈N and {Qn}n∈N in Q with Rn → R, Qn → Q, and Rn ∈ Φ(Qn), we have R ∈ Φ(Q). To
prove this, it suffices to show that the map
(q, Q) 7→ f(0, i,q) + F (Q) · q is continuous, for all i ∈ S. (A.25)
Indeed, given R¯ ∈ Q, Rn ∈ Φ(Qn) implies f(0, i, Rni ) +F (Qn) ·Rni ≥ f(0, i, R¯i)+F (Qn) · R¯i for all
i ∈ S. We can then conclude from (A.25) that f(0, i, Ri) + F (Q) · Ri ≥ f(0, i, R¯i) + F (Q) · R¯i for
all i ∈ S, as n→∞. Since R¯ ∈ Q is arbitrarily chosen, this shows that R ∈ Φ(Q).
Proving (A.25) boils down to establishing the continuity of
Q 7→ F (Q) = (F (1, Q), F (2, Q), ..., F (N,Q)) .
Take {Qn}n∈N in Q such that Qn → Q ∈ Q. Denote by µn and µ the laws of X under Qn and
Q, respectively. Note that µn and µ are probability measures on D([0,∞);S), the space of ca`dla`g
processes taking values in S. By [8, p. 262, Problem 8], Qn → Q implies that µn converges weakly
to µ. Then, by the Skorokhod representaion theorem, there exists ca`dla`g processes Y n and Y ,
defined on the same probability space (Ω,F , P ), such that the laws of Y n and Y are µn and µ
respectively, and Y n → Y under the Skorokhod topology on D([0,∞);S) P -a.s. In particular, we
have Y nt → Yt, P × dt-a.e. Since S is a finite set, we in fact have Y nt = Yt for n large enough,
P × dt-a.e. Then
F (i,Qn) = EP
[∫ ∞
0
f(t, Y nt , Q
n
Y nt
)dt
]
→ EP
[∫ ∞
0
f(t, Yt, QYt)dt
]
= F (i,Q).
This establishes the continuity of Q 7→ F (Q), and thus gives the upper semicontinuity of Φ.
Now, we can apply Kakutani-Fan’s fixed-point theorem (see e.g. [9, Theorem 1]) to conclude
that Φ admits a fixed point Q∗ ∈ Q, i.e. Q∗ ∈ Φ(Q∗). This implies that Q∗ satisfies (3.10) for all
(i,Q) ∈ S ×Q, and is thus a weak equilibrium, thanks to Theorem 3.1.
If f(0, i, ·) is strictly concave for all i ∈ S, then the fixed point Q∗ satisfies strict inequalities
f(0, i, Q∗i ) + F (Q
∗) ·Q∗i > f(0, i, Ri) + F (Q∗) · Ri for all i ∈ S and R ∈ Q with Ri 6= Q∗i . That is,
(3.21) is satisfied. Thus, Proposition 3.2 asserts that Q∗ is a strong equilibrium.
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B Proofs for Section 5
B.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Define the set-valued map Φ : A → 2A by
Φ(u) :=
{
w ∈ A : w ∈ argmax
u′∈A
V (i, u′ ⊗1 u), ∀i ∈ S
}
.
Fix u ∈ A. For any i ∈ S, define g : Ai → R by
g(α) := κ(0, i, α) +
N∑
j=1
(
Ej,u
[
∞∑
t=0
κ(t+ 1,Xt, uXt)
]
· αj
)
.
Since κ is continuous in α, so is g. With P being compact, Ax ⊆ P is also compact, and thus there
exists a maximizer α(i) ∈ Ai for g. By taking wi := α(i) for all i ∈ S, we get w ∈ Φ(u). For each
i ∈ S, the continuity of g : Ai → R and the closedness of Ai also imply the closedness of the set of
optimizers of g. It follows that Φ(u) is closed. Also, g : Ai → R is concave, thanks to the concavity
of κ in α. The set of optimizers of g is then convex, which yields the convexity of Φ(u).
Next, we show that Φ is upper semicontinuous. That is, for any un, u, wn, w ∈ A with un → u,
wn → w, if wn ∈ Φ(un) then w ∈ Φ(u). It suffices to show that the map (u′, u) 7→ V (i, u′ ⊗1 u)
is continuous, for all i ∈ S. In view of (5.4) and the concavity of κ(0, i, ·), u′ 7→ V (i, u′ ⊗1 u) is
continuous. It remains to show that for any j ∈ S, the map
h(u) := Ej,u
[
∞∑
t=0
κ(t+ 1,Xt, uXt)
]
, u ∈ A
is continuous. Take {un} in A with un → u. Fix ε > 0. By (5.2), there exists T ∈ N such that∑∞
t=T
(
max(i,α)∈S×P |κ(t, i, α)|
)
< ε. It follows that
lim sup
n→∞
|h(un)− h(u)|
≤ lim sup
n→∞
∣∣∣∣∣Ej,u
[
T∑
t=0
κ(t+ 1,Xt, u
n
Xt)
]
− Ej,u
[
T∑
t=0
κ(t+ 1,Xt, uXt)
]∣∣∣∣∣+ 2ε
= lim sup
n→∞
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=0
N∑
k=1
κ(t+ 1, k, unk )((u
n)t)jk −
T∑
t=0
N∑
z=1
κ(t+ 1, k, uk)(u
t)jk
∣∣∣∣∣+ 2ε
≤ lim sup
n→∞
T∑
t=0
N∑
k=1
∣∣κ(t+ 1, k, un(z))((un)t)jk − κ(t+ 1, k, uk)(ut)jk∣∣+ 2ε = 2ε,
where the matrix (un)t (resp. ut ) is the t-fold product of un (resp. u). By the arbitrariness of
ε > 0, h is continuous.
Now, by Kakutani-Fan’s fixed-point theorem (see e.g. [9, Theorem 1]), Φ admits a fixed point,
i.e. there exists u∗ ∈ A such that u∗ ∈ Φ(u∗). That is, u∗ is an equilibrium.
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B.2 Proof of Lemma 5.1
For clarity, in the proof below we will denote by X the continuous-time Markov chain and Y the
discrete-time Markov chain, respectively. First, observe that
|Hni (un)− Fi(Q∗)|
≤
∣∣∣∣∣Ei,un
[
∞∑
k=0
f((k + 1)δn, Yk, Q
n
Yk
) · δn
]
− Ei,Qn
[
∞∑
k=0
f((k + 1)δn,Xkδn , Q
n
Xkδn
) · δn
]∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣Ei,Qn
[
∞∑
k=0
f((k + 1)δn,Xkδn , Q
n
Xkδn
) · δn
]
− Ei,Qn
[∫ ∞
0
f(t,Xt, Q
n
Xt) dt
]∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣Ei,Qn
[∫ ∞
0
f(t,Xt, Q
n
Xt) dt
]
− Ei,Q∗
[∫ ∞
0
f(t,Xt, Q
∗
Xt) dt
]∣∣∣∣ .
Let In1 , I
n
2 , and I
n
3 denote the second, third, and fourth line, respectively, in the above inequality.
Consider In1 first. Let ε > 0. Recall T > 0 given in (5.8). By (2.3), there is M > T such that∫ ∞
M
sup
i,q
|f(t, i,q)| dt < ε. (B.1)
Then, by (5.8), we have
In1 ≤ δn
∑
k<M/δn
∣∣∣Ei,un [f((k + 1)δn, Yk, QnYk)]− Ei,Qn [f((k + 1)δn,Xkδn , QnXkδn )
]∣∣∣+ 2ε.
Observe that
Ei,un
[
f((k + 1)δn, Yk, Q
n
Yk
)
]
=
∑
j∈S
f((k + 1)δn, j,Q
n
j )((u
n)k)ij
Ei,Qn
[
f((k + 1)δn,Xkδn , Q
n
Xkδn
)
]
=
∑
j∈S
f((k + 1)δn, j,Q
n
j )((u˜
n)k)ij ,
where u˜n is the transition matrix for the Markov chain (Xkδn)k induced by Qn. That is, with the
probability P induced by Qn = (qnij), we have u˜
n
ij = P(Xδn = j |X0 = i). Note that
u˜nij =
{
1 + qniiδn + o(δn), j = i,
qnijδn + o(δn), j 6= i,
= uij + o(δn).
It follows that ((u˜n)k)ij = ((u
n)k)ij + k · o(δn) · (1 + o(δn))k. Now, since
|k · o(δn) · (1 + o(δn))k| ≤ M
δn
· o(δn)(1 + δn)M/δn = o(1),
we conclude that
In1 = δn
∑
i<M/δn
o(1) + 2ε = o(1) + 2ε→ 2ε.
By the arbitrariness of ε > 0, we get In1 → 0.
Next, we consider In2 . For any ε > 0, recall M > T given in (B.1). Then,
In2 ≤
∑
k<M/δn
Ei,Qn
∣∣∣∣∣f
(
(k + 1)δn,Xkδn , Q
n
Xkδn
)
δn −
∫ (k+1)δn
kδn
f
(
t,Xt, Q
n
Xt
)
dt
∣∣∣∣∣+ 2ε.
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Since f(·, i, ·) is continuous, it is uniformly continuous on the compact set [0, T ] ×Dai with Dai :=
{q ∈ Di : ||q|| ≤ a}. As a result, there exists a modulus of continuity function ρ, independent of
i ∈ S and n ∈ N, such that |f(t, i,Qni )− f(t′, i, Qni )| ≤ ρ(|t− t′|). Consider
Jnk :=
∣∣∣∣∣f
(
(k + 1)δn,Xkδn , Q
n
Xkδn
)
δn −
∫ (k+1)δn
kδn
f
(
t,Xt, Q
n
Xt
)
dt
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
and the event Ank := {there is no jump for X in the time interval (kδn, (k + 1)δn]}. Then, we have
Ei,Qn [J
n
k ] = Ei,Qn[J
n
k |Ank ] · P(Ank) + Ei,Qn [Jnk |(Ank )c] · P((Ank)c)
= (ρ(δn) · δn) · (1−O(δn)) +O(δn) ·O(δn) = o(δn).
As a result,
In2 ≤
∑
k<M/δn
o(δn) + 2ε = o(1) + 2ε→ 2ε.
By the arbitrariness of ε > 0, we get In2 → 0.
Finally, from the argument in the proof of Theorem 3.3, we have In3 → 0.
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